While failing
to protect the Indians against the traders, the government also
failed to protect the frontier in an adequate manner against the
vengeance of the Indians who had a desire to even matters.
Apparently the government failed to realize that as the frontier
expanded to the west and northwest in Iowa there was also a
growing need for protection. Many unfortunate incidents had
occurred along the border before a government surveyor by the
name of Marsh, from Dubuque, was attacked near the Des Moines
River in 1849."Upon the filing of Marsh's complaint, soldiers,
dispatched from Fort Snelling in Minnesota, established Fort
Clarke (later renamed Fort Dodge) on August 23, 1850." The
inadequate garrison of this post, numbering two officers and
sixty-six men, was at this time practically the only defense on
the northwestern Iowa frontier. Following the establishment of
this fort the predatory Sioux bands generally retired westward
ten or twenty miles.
By 1851 the last remaining Sioux lands within the limits of Iowa
had been ceded and opened to settlement. Trouble for a time
seemed at an end. Until that time the only protection against
the Indians was the "Watchfulness, courage and trusty arms" of
the settlers themselves, with the nearest troops probably one
hundred fifty miles away at Fort Randall on the Missouri and
Fort Snelling in Minnesota near the mouth of the Minnesota
River.
Occasional rumors of Sioux activity still came from the outlying
settlements. The most definite of these came from the valley of
the Boyer more than fifty miles to the southwest of Fort Dodge.
Here a family was attacked and some of its members carried away
as prisoners. This was in October, 1852. A detachment was sent
from Fort Dodge which took and held as hostages the Indian
leaders, Inkpaduta and Umpashota. Upon the return of the
prisoners, the Indians were liberated. Other Indian incursions
reported from the north usually dissipated into mere rumors."
The apparent quietness of the Indians in this section induced
General Clarke, commanding the Sixth Military Division, to
direct the abandonment of Fort Dodge. This order, which was
issued on March 30, 1853, directed the removal of the garrison
to Fort Ridgely. With the abandonment of the post by Major
Woods, there were left at Fort Dodge only Major Williams, his
son James B. Williams, and two discharged soldiers. A more
ill-advised order could scarcely have been issued; for following
the actual abandonment of the post on June 2, 1853, the Indians
"inaugurated a reign of terror among the settlers as far east as
the Cedar river."
Manv settlers in alarm began the abandonment of their homes; but
many others, having staked all in the development of their
claims, decided to remain and appeal to both the State and
National governments for protection. Appeal to the latter
availed nothing. The Indian authorities at Washington were
entirely out of touch with the situation: they were firm in the
belief that the treaties of Traverse des Sioux and Mendota had
definitely settled the question of Indian occupation in this
section and that the Indians had withdrawn or had ceased being
troublesome.
Parties of Indians frequently returned to their former hunting
grounds, and nearly as frequently committed depredations more or
less terrorizing to the widely scattered settlers along the Des
Moines. Weary of making unheeded appeals to National
authorities, while the Indian depredations became more alarming,
the settlers appealed to the State officials. Major William
Williams, who had accompanied the troops at the time of the
founding of Fort Dodge and who had remained after its
abandonment, was authorized by Governor Hempstead to organize a
force, if necessary, to protect the frontier." Little, however,
could be done in the way of organizing an adequate force on
account of the widely scattered character of the settlements.
In a letter to Governor Grimes in 1855 Major Williams again
expressed his great anxiety for the safety of the frontier as
the Indians had become increasingly bolder. His former
commission was renewed and he was granted full power to act upon
any sign of hostility. Not only did Governor Grimes receive
urgent letters from Major Williams, but from others as well: he
was beset with petitions for protection.
The Governor appears to have been wholly at a loss as to what
course to pursue, since he believed he had no power to act. He
appealed, therefore, to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs at
Washington‐although he believed that his only reward would be an
acknowledgment of his letters with promise of action. Failing
here, he appealed to the President, but received no response.
Finally, in apparent despair, he wrote to Secretary of State
George W. McCleary that he knew not "how much credit to give to
any of "the letters he had received and in fact he had about
made up his mind to disbelieve them all. As a last appeal for
action, the Governor addressed a letter to the Iowa delegation
in Congress on January 3, 1855, in which he expressed the hope
that they would cooperate with him in pressing the matter upon
the attention of the proper Federal officials and in urging
badly needed relief."
Not only were the settlers near Fort Dodge alarmed, but those in
Woodbury, Monona, and Harrison counties were even more
disturbed, owing to the hostile attitude of large bands of
Omahas and Otoes in that section. Near Sergeant Bluff large
bands of Sioux had gathered and expressed their determination to
remain, while nearly five hundred Sioux were encamped in the
vicinity of Fort Dodge. These Indians amused themselves by
stealing hogs, cattle, and other property of the settlers. Fears
for the safety of the settlers were increased, in view of the
fact that the National government was now preparing to chastise
the Sioux near Fort Laramie for their manifold crimes committed
along the California and Oregon trail in Nebraska and Wyoming.
It was thought this action would cause the Sioux to seek refuge
east of the Missouri and, as a matter of revenge, carry death
and destruction with them as they tied toward the Mississippi
Valley frontier.
Because the Indians were becoming more threatening, appearing in
larger numbers than heretofore, and extending their depredations
over an increasingly wider territory, in the early winter of
1855 Governor Grimes was asked to call out the militia; but he
declined since he believed he was "authorized to call out a
military force only in case of an actual insurrection or hostile
invasion." Nearly everyone now anticipated bloodshed. White men,
illy disposed, were reaping large profits from the sale of
whiskey; while the Indians were "becoming devils".
Hence, Governor Grimes on December 3, 1855, addressed a letter
to President Pierce urging that the Indians be removed to their
treaty reserves. The Governor pointedly stated that the
government owed protection to these settlers in the homes it had
encouraged them to occupy. He further stated that a post in this
section would curb the Indians and give quiet to north- western
Iowa. "To be sure these troubles had not reached any great
magnitude," yet there was a continuous succession of annoying
and suspicious occurrences which kept the frontier settlements
in a state of perpetual dread and apprehension, and made life a
burden". Even in the presence of this distressing condition of
affairs the military authorities of the National government did
nothing to relieve matters. No troops were sent to protect the
settlers, nor were the letters of Governor Grimes even granted
consideration. Thus there developed slowly but surely a
situation where the Indians grew sufficiently emboldened to make
a general attack.
Such a policy, characterized by a disregard not only for Indian
welfare but also for the well‐being of the white frontiersmen,
could only bring unhappy consequences. It became more and more
apparent that the Indians were bent upon concerted action of
some sort. Annoyances now occurred along the whole frontier, no
part of which was free from alarm. War parties were in evidence
in nearly every section, and the attitude of the Indians became
one of defiance. Not only in Woodbury, Monona, and Harrison
counties, but in Buena Vista and what are now Humboldt, Webster,
Kossuth, Palo Alto, and Sac counties the settlers were feeling
the effects of Indian enmity.
The resentment of the Indians at this time arose partly from a
feeling of jealousy toward the whites, partly from the fact that
they were retrograding, and partly from the undue influence of
the American Fur Company. From the start the Indians,
particularly the Sioux, had been jealous and suspicions of the
whites. As time passed and the Indian observed indications of a
general and permanent occupation by the whites of the territory
which he had known as home, his jealous fears increased. The
land of his fathers, the home of his traditions, was about to
pass into the hands of another people, to the intense sorrow of
the Indian. It "was a trying ordeal" and "naturally awakened in
his breast feelings of bitter regret and jealousy."His"distrust
grew into open protest as claims were staked off, cabins built,
and the ground prepared for cultivation." It seemed that the
Indians had resolved not to submit "until they had entered an
armed protest against the justice of the claim which
civilization makes to all the earth."
In addition to this feeling of jealousy and distrust of the
whites, the Indians were gradually retrograding by taking unto
themselves many of the vices of the white race. This was the
inevitable result of a loose administration of the frontier
which permitted it to be invaded in many places by refugees from
civilization. Although this statement may seem to be somewhat
sweeping, it is a well-known fact that among the first to appear
on the frontier there were always some men of the reckless,
rough‐and‐ready type whose contempt for the finer things of
civilized life made a longer residence amid such surroundings
undesirable and frequently impossible.
Foremost among the causes of the red man's retrogression may be
cited whiskey," But there were other causes, such as the treaty
of 1855 with the Chippewas, which rendered the agent powerless
to control the Indian or his seducers if he had so desired. Then
there were the errors committed by people who were brought to
the frontier by the government as helpers in advancing the
Indian's welfare, but who had, through mistaken methods,
produced opposite results. Again, the Indian had been mistakenly
led downward by many years of luxurious idleness and riotous
living .... In this state of demoralization they were gathered
up and thrown together on their little Reserve, where all the
worst characters could act in concert, and where they found
bloody work for their idle hands to do.
The government had liberally supplied them with tobacco, and
they had never lacked money with which to buy whiskey. Their
wants had been looked after so paternally that they had little
else to do but spend their time in idleness. Craving
entertainment they soon learned to find it in a wrong way. They
no longer cared to hunt for food, since they did not need to do
so. Soon their expeditions became mere raids upon their
protectors, accompanied by unrestrained destruction committed to
gratify their craving for some form of entertainment. Thus,
while the forces of retrogression were at work the Indian was
daily becoming more of a menace to the well-disposed border
settlers who viewed his changing attitude in helpless terror.
But most insidious of all in keeping the Indian mimical to his
white neighbors was the influence of the fur
traders—especially those of the American Fur Company. The
admitted purpose of this organization was to keep the Indian a
savage hunter and at the same time to frighten the white
settlers away from the frontier in order that the annual crop of
cheaply obtained but valuable furs might not suffer diminution.
To keep the Indian in such a condition it was necessary to
prevent him from assuming too friendly an attitude toward the
whites ‐in order that he might the better beat back or
discourage their westward advance. There were strong suspicions
that more than one attack upon border settlers by Indians
occurred because the presence of these settlers threatened the
fur‐gathering preserves of the American Fur Company.
It would be wrong, however, to create the impression that the
fur traders operated in secret. Practically everyone knew their
purpose and methods : their purposes they openly admitted, and
their methods consisted largely in dispensing "fire water" and
in selling to the Indian on credit. The latter practice was
useful, for it obligated the Indian to serve the Company in
realizing its ends. Perhaps the most notable example of the
Company's interference with plans of Indian amelioration is to
be found in the case of the Winnebagoes. Their agent, Joseph M.
Street, one of the most enlightened Indian agents the Iowa
country ever knew, had for some years been striving to improve
the condition of the Winnebagoes, but without success. He had
failed, not because his plan was impracticable, but because he
came into direct conflict with the purposes and methods of the
American Fur Company. |
